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1.  INTRODUCTION
The global gas industry has been transformed thanks to liquefied natural
gas (LNG). LNG has become more and more desirable in the past few
decades because of its trade flexibility and its ability to increase energy
security. Considering that the European Union and non-European Union
(EU) Balkan countries are dependent on gas imports, LNG can enhance
the energy security of these countries. However, the distribution of gas
among the Balkan countries requires interconnected and developed gas
infrastructure. As a result, in this research, the manner in which LNG
can secure energy supplies of non-EU Balkan countries and thus enhance
regional interconnectivity will be elaborated.
We argue that energy investments cannot be explained purely by
economies of scale, due to the small size of the Balkan gas market.
Therefore, energy security and the EU’s energy strategies of 2020, 2030
and 2050 would complement regional integration aspirations. In this
context, we observe that future arguments related to this topic will likely
be related to the form of gas supply, such as pipeline or LNG, rather than
country of origin. Equally important with the form of supply, we assert
that regional interconnectivity is vital for securing energy supplies of the
Balkan countries and thus enhancing regional cooperation. Hence, we
claim that the desire of Western Balkan countries to comply with the
energy and environment strategies of the EU will increase policy
entrepreneurship of the EU Commission. This will foster solidarity and
thus increase investment incentives.
This article is divided into seven sections. After this introduction,
section 2 provides theoretical background on European energy integration.
In section 3, the global LNG market, the European gas market, and the
Balkan gas market will be assessed in order to understand global and
regional gas dynamics. After the assessment of the Balkan gas market,
the energy security of the Balkans is discussed in section 4. To enhance
energy security, the prospects of LNG in the Balkans and gas
interconnectivity in the region are elaborated in section 5. Section 6 also
presents a comparative analysis of internal and external advantages and
disadvantages is also provided, while section 7 sets out the conclusions.
2.  EUROPEAN ENERGY INTEGRATION: THE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
European integration has a vast literature. For this reason, to understand
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policy and interconnectivity as well as to provide contextual analysis, a
brief overview of the theoretical framework is necessary. The European
integration and single market objective rely on neo-liberal, particularly
institutionalist assumptions (which are relevant for anti-corruption goals,
thus facilitating investments). Neo-liberals argue that peaceful
cooperation is possible if democracy, economic interdependence, and
international organizations exist.1 (Swisa, 2011: 130). These three
assumptions are key ingredients of European integration since they foster
cooperation and reduce corruption and the likelihood of conflict. Besides,
funding infrastructure projects through an institutional mechanism
enhance interdependence and cooperation between countries.
Political and security considerations as well as seeing the Balkan
countries as a part of European identity opened a way for EU membership
for these countries. Besides the EU integration and single market
literature, Copeland’s trade expectations theory asserts that expectations
from future trade affect the state’s decision to go to war. Current trade
between countries can be low or non-existent but positive expectations
from the future are vital for the continuity of peace.2 Copeland’s theory
can be interpreted for the Balkans, especially given the history of recent
conflicts. Most notably, the break-up of Yugoslavia and ensuing ethnic
conflicts across the region (Kosovo, Bosnia, Serbia, North Macedonia,
etc.) are important challenges that need to be overcome to establish a
basis for regional cooperation and development.
Following the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Balkans were
faced with bloody Bosnian and Kosovo wars. Still, these wars have an
effect on the current relations between these countries. For instance,
relations between Serbia-Albania, Greece-North Macedonia, and Greece-
Kosovo are fraught with serious issues that need to be addressed. Hence,
cooperation and trust-building are not easy to achieve in the region. For
gas, the Balkan gas market is small and immature, so there are fewer
incentives for investments due to concerns about economic viability. With
EU funds, however, these countries can increase interconnectivity with
each other as well as with the EU countries. This leads to increasing
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interdependence, transparency, and creating positive expectations from
future economic trade. Moreover, future economic and social integration
decreases the likelihood of conflict.
The European Union has been praised for its role in stabilizing Eastern
Europe and has received the Nobel Peace Prize as an institution on grounds
that it solidified reconciliation, stability, and fraternity in the European
continent.3 Arguably, the EU is, in practice, displaying features of an
international society and solidarity within an institutional collaboration.
Such institutional collaboration has binding obligations on its members.
This display of institutionalism also conforms with the Kantian4 and
Grotian traditions of solidarity, as well as solidarity among a community
of states.5 As part of strong institutional mechanisms, the European
Commission monitors and assists member states to increase compliance
with the EU laws, policies, and targets. This gives the Commission a role
of policy entrepreneur.
The Commission’s role as a “policy entrepreneur” is described as its
power to take initiatives and to act as an institution that generates
ideas prior to policy implementation. The Commission often uses external
expertise through seminars, conferences and research groups to have
discussions prior to the shaping of new “entrepreneurial” policy initiatives.
Thus, the Commission is able to propose new courses of action and
policies for adoption by member states, which in turn solidify solidarity
and common practice among members.6
The Commission’s interaction and coordination with all members
increase solidarity in the Union since it can influence policymaking in
member states, provide solutions during crises and contribute to social
construction.7 In the context of Balkans, the involvement of the
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Commission to converge the Balkan countries to the EU laws, policies
and targets have the potential to increase solidarity in the region, and
thus reduce the likelihood of new conflicts. Therefore, thanks to policy
entrepreneurship of the Commission, Western Balkan countries can
potentially attract investments.
These future expectations for Western Balkans are insufficient unless
they are complemented with the EU integration, social expectations of
the EU membership such as transparency and good governance (especially
anti-corruption) and the EU’s energy strategies. The Balkan market is of
little significance at the global and regional levels and it is open for
development as indicated in the following parts. In light of this perspective
that institutionalism is the driving force behind investment in the Balkan
energy security, the article will assess global and regional market
developments.
3.  AN ASSESSMENT OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
3.1 Global LNG Market
With the changing gas production and consumption patterns, the natural
gas industry has transformed, and LNG has become a little more
competitive. In 2018, 943.4 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas was traded
globally of which 431 bcm was LNG. This 431 bcm of LNG accounts for
45.7 per cent of global gas trade.8 According to the International Energy
Agency (IEA), in 2000, the share of LNG in the global gas trade was only
23 per cent.9 This means that the share of LNG has been growing in the
international gas trade and has been changing the gas market patterns.
A significant increase in unconventional gas production allowed the
U.S. to have a considerable domestic production and decreased gas
imports over time. This enabled the United States to become self-sufficient
as well as a net gas exporter by 2017. Developments in shale increased
the availability of gas around the world, thus decreasing spot gas prices.
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The slightly more flexible trade of LNG makes it preferable to pipeline
gas trade for many countries. For instance, the construction of the LNG
terminal in Poland completed in 2015 allowed the import of LNG from
different producers. In 2017, Poland received its first U.S. LNG, enabling
it to reduce its high gas dependency on Russia.10 Similarly, in 2016,
Lithuanian floating LNG terminal was inaugurated, and the country
received its first U.S. LNG in 2017.11
LNG allowed these two countries to improve their energy security by
increasing alternative sources. Availability of alternatives also gave
leverage to these countries to renegotiate gas prices in their long-term
gas contracts. Similarly, LNG in the Balkans can foster competition and
help these countries to diversify their sources, thus securing their energy
supplies. The discourse of energy security in Europe and the Balkans are
mostly on gas and least on crude oil.
A major difference between natural gas from petroleum is that gas is
less flexible, and spot markets are more regional and represent a small
share of the global gas trade. Crude oil, which is more fungible and
liquid, thus transported in barrels has the feature of a global commodity
market. Also, crude oil has international institutions such as the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and IEA
stocks. Unlike oil, natural gas does not have international institutions.
Most resembling institutional cooperation are IEA, EU institutions and
smaller institutions such as Energy Charter and Gas Exporting Countries
Forum.12
LNG, in the long run, could potentially be a game-changer by allowing
gas to increasingly become a global market and allow a logistic
transportation and trade flexibility very much as it is in the case of oil.
However, pipelines and networks are needed to distribute gas to retail
markets, considerable infrastructure and installations are necessary to
liquefy, transport, and regasify LNG in the supply chain. Therefore, it
still would take a lot more of economies of scale to achieve a growing
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global spot price market similar to oil. In the meantime, because of the
relative inflexibility and high transport and infrastructure costs, LNG,
similar to natural gas, is still dominated by mid- and long-term contracts.
According to IEA, global gas demand is expected to rise by 20 per
cent between 2016 and 2030 and 14 per cent between 2030 and 2040.13
With the increase in liquefaction capacity in Australia, the U.S., Russia,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, global liquefaction capacity reached 502 bcm
and global regasification reached 1,157 bcm in 2017. In the short run,
an additional 130 bcm of liquefaction capacity is expected to come
onstream around 2021, contributing to spot market development.14
Therefore, we can expect in the near future that an increase in the number
of LNG facilities will further decrease LNG import prices, making LNG
more attractive than pipelines. Also, liquidity and convenience in the
LNG trade undermine new major pipeline projects to be developed (with
the exception of those needed for retail and interconnectivity). Owing to
the small size of gas markets, population and economies of scale, this is
not the case for the Balkans.
Prices in the European market support this prediction. Gas import
price by pipeline rose above US$9.50/MMBtu in 2014 before decreasing
to around US$7.55/MMBtu in 2018. Also, LNG import price for Europe
was around US$8.50/MMBtu in 2014 and later decreased to around
US$7.50/MMBtu in 2018.15 This shows that pipeline and LNG prices
have become competitive in Europe. Between 2014 and 2017, the average
LNG import prices for Japan and Korea dropped from above US$16/
MMBtu to US$9.90/MMBtu. In the same years, LNG import prices for
the U.S. dropped from US$8.14/MMBtu to US$3.13/MMBtu.16  Therefore,
these prices suggest that LNG import prices in Europe and Asia are
becoming less differentiated and are in a converging trend over the last
few years. Furthermore, these trends may lead to a global commodity
pricing formulation for natural gas in the long-term.
LNG contracts between 2011 and 2016 show that consumer countries
preferred shorter contract periods with smaller volumes, hence less
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commitment.17 Therefore, gas trade has become more flexible since long-
term gas contracts create dependency on energy-producing countries. To
ensure the sale of gas in the future, big gas producers such as Russia
started to provide flexibilities in pipeline gas contracts, especially regarding
take-or-pay clauses. Consequently, new gas contracts started to have a
hybrid identity. Hybrid identity is defined as “various forms of supply
arrangements – long-term and short-term, large and small, oil-indexed,
hub-based and spot – [which] coexist and compete with each other,
reflecting the different needs of buyers and sellers alike.”18 As shown,
global LNG trade dynamics have a direct effect on regional gas trade
patterns. Since the main focus of this research is the Balkans, European
gas market needs to be assessed.
3.2 The European Gas Market
Following an increase in its gas consumption together with the low
indigenous gas production, the EU has become a net gas importer in the
past decades. In particular, a considerable decline that occurred in certain
fields such as Groningen in the Netherlands due to social factors have
further accelerated the decline in gas output in the EU.19 The 2018 gas
demand of the EU was 474 bcm of gas, of which 363 bcm was imported.
Gas was imported from Russia (40 per cent), Norway (32 per cent), Algeria
and Libya (10 per cent) and LNG (18 per cent).20
With the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises, energy security has become
one of the priorities for the European Union. Even though the crises were
between Russia and Ukraine, gas disruptions had a negative impact on
the European countries especially on Central and Eastern Europe,
including the Balkans. Diversifying energy sources and routes to ensure
and secure the continuous supply of energy became one of the top priorities
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in the EU’s energy agenda. With the climax of Russian-Ukrainian crises
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, concerns on energy
supply security resurfaced as dominant topic of European discourse.
In the aftermath of the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises, the European
Union developed 2020, 2030 and 2050 strategies to address energy
security issues and to combat climate change. With these strategies, the
EU targets to increase the share of renewables by 20 per cent in 2020
and 27 per cent in 2030; increase energy efficiency by 20 per cent in 2020
and 27 per cent in 2030; reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent
in 2020, 40 per cent in 2030 and 80-95 per cent by 2050 compared to
1990 levels.21
Moreover, the EU signed the Paris Agreement which opened for
signature in 2016. The agreement aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and combat climate change by keeping the global average temperature
below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels.22 This indicates the EU’s
strong intention to fight with global warming. All these strategies and
targets are monitored and governed by the Commission, showing the
Commission’s substantial role as a policy entrepreneur. After the set of
these strategies, the European countries have increased their reliance on
renewables and natural gas. Gas is one of the safest and cleanest
alternatives these countries have compared to nuclear energy, coal, or
other fossil fuels since gas releases less carbon dioxide to the atmosphere,
thus enabling these countries to meet with these standards.23
Consequently, in recent years, gas imports of the EU have been increasing.
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Figure 1: LNG Import Terminals in Europe
Source: Map created by authors using Google Maps and data from Gas
Infrastructure Europe.
Among gas imports, although the share of LNG in imports has
increased, pipeline gas trade is still dominant in Europe. As shown in
(Figure 2), there are 24 LNG facilities owned by 11-member states. The
total import capacity of the 24 facilities was 210 bcm in 2017. With the
completion of the planned facilities’ constructions, LNG import capacity
of the Union will rise to 282 bcm in 2026.24 The planned facilities will be
in Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland,
and the UK. Besides the EU countries, one LNG facility was planned for
Albania, one in Ukraine and two in Turkey.
Even though the Union has the ability to cover approximately 43 per
cent of its gas demand from LNG,25 imports from that source remained
relatively low. There are two reasons for the underutilization of the LNG
facilities. First, hybrid Russian gas contracts make pipeline gas trade
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more attractive. In addition, selling its gas below spot prices have made
Russian gas competitive compared to LNG. For instance, in 2017, Russian
gas sold at around US$5.9/MMBtu while European spot prices were
around US$6.2/MMBtu (Henderson et al. 2018: 4). Secondly, high gas
prices in the Asian market led LNG ships to be diverted to Asian countries.
Therefore, Russia’s ability to make price dumping and supply a vast
amount of gas thanks to its geographical proximity made the European
market less attractive in the eyes of LNG producing countries. Weighed
against the European scale, Balkans gas potentials holds but small
significance. Next, we look at the Balkan gas market as a regional market
integration prospect.
3.3 Balkan Gas Market
The discussion of energy security for the EU dates back to Central and
Eastern enlargement of 2004 and 2007. Gas infrastructure and market
dynamics of Central and Eastern European countries are behind those of
Western Europe. The latter countries have developed gas infrastructure,
competitive and liberal markets, and gas is priced according to hub
prices due to competition.26 (Jirušek et al 2017: 336). With the EU as an
anchor, some Central and Eastern countries, including the Balkans, have
made some progress. Since there is no gas trading hub for the Balkan
countries, gas is traded based on the bilateral agreements and these
countries do not have alternative gas supplies. In the following decades,
Italy and Greece could aspire to become physical centres of gas
distribution for the Balkans. The Balkan countries even do not have
access to LNG, except through Greece which has 5 bcm capacity in the
Revithoussa LNG terminal.27 Therefore, Russia is currently the sole gas
supplier for these countries. However, this situation is likely to change
with the realization of new LNG and pipeline projects in neighbouring
EU Balkan and Adriatic countries.
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Table 1: Economic and Social Indicators of Non-EU Balkan Countries
Source: World Bank.
The main reason impeding the Balkan countries from reaching LNG
is that many of them, especially the non-EU Balkan countries, are not
major markets, thus in economic terms, they are not very attractive to
investors. As can be seen in Table 1, not much Foreign Direct Investments
have been made to these countries. Moreover, the relatively small
populations of these countries reduce the likelihood to attract substantial
investments for infrastructure.
The Balkan countries also do not have robust and connected gas
infrastructure for bringing LNG from Greece. Hence, these countries are
over-dependent on a single supplier and are thus vulnerable to gas supply
disruptions. Being the sole supplier enables Russia to negotiate bilaterally
and to charge higher gas prices than hubs apart from sometimes using
the commodity as political leverage as some observers have alleged. As a
result, the Union has focused on providing energy-related solutions to
the Southern European countries.
In 2014, the EU released the Energy Security Strategy in response to
concerns over gas disruptions. In the short-term, the Union developed
and simulated two scenarios. The first pictured a complete cessation of
Russian gas and the second focused on gas disruptions in Ukraine transit
route. The results of the simulations suggested that long supply
disruptions would have a significant effect on Southeastern EU countries
as well as the Energy Community countries.28 In the long term, five key
28 European Commission, “Energy Security Strategy”, https://ec.europa.eu/
energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/energy-security-strategy,
(accessed 28 May 2019).
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action points were identified for addressing the security of energy supply:
(i) Increasing energy efficiency; (ii) Increasing energy production and
diversifying supplier countries and routes; (iii) Completing the internal
energy market; (iv) Speaking with one voice; (v) Strengthening emergency
and solidarity mechanisms.29 For our research, the second, third and
fifth action points are the most relevant for non-EU Balkans. In a London
Summit on the Western Balkans in 2018, the EU openly committed to
expanding cooperation with Western Balkan countries in the areas of
economy and security.30 This is in line with the policy of interconnectivity
with surrounding EU member states for electricity and gas markets among
other things. Moreover, an increase in cooperation between the EU and
the Balkan countries will foster the entrepreneurship policy of the
Commission, which is vital for increasing solidarity as well as attracting
investments.
To support infrastructure projects and ensure the security of supply,
the EU formed Projects of Common Interest (PCI). These projects are
generally composed of construction and infrastructure improvements,
potentially including pipelines, interconnectors, reverse flow technologies,
gas storages, LNG terminals, and compressors.31 The PCI helps member
states to develop their infrastructure and increase interconnectivity with
each other, and secure energy supply by deepening cooperation. Projects
that received funding from PCI include the feasibility studies of Eastring
pipeline and LNG facilities in Greece and Croatia, as well as the
construction of interconnector Greece- Bulgaria.32
The EU allocated •5.35 billion to fund the PCIs between 2014 and
2020.33 The Energy Community provides EU funds to these countries, so
that missing infrastructure between EU and non-EU countries can be
built. All these suggest that economic investments alone cannot
sufficiently account for energy investments in the Balkans. As argued in
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the part below, institutional cooperation to invest in energy security
would be a stronger motive. That will provide investment incentives.
4.  ENERGY SECURITY OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES
Established in 2006, the Energy Community is a tool of the EU for
integrating energy markets and laws of the EU neighbouring countries
with the EU energy market and law, hence increasing energy security
and regional cooperation.34 Currently, non-EU Balkan states have different
status on the EU membership track.35 Bosnia & Herzegovina became a
candidate country in 2003, North Macedonia in 2005, Montenegro in
2010, Serbia in 2012, Albania in 2014 and Kosovo 2008.36 Energy
Community provides EU funds and grants to its members and in return,
it expects compliance with the EU energy laws, policies, and regulations.
2018 budget of Energy Community was •4.76 billion since it includes
Western Balkan countries as well as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.37
Therefore, EU funds have an important place for the Balkans in the way
of development of interconnectivity and interdependence as well as to
implement EU strategies of 2020, 2030 and 2050 to combat climate
change.
To become an EU member, these countries need to fulfil the
Copenhagen criteria and approximate their laws to the EU law. In this
context, the reforms adopted under the Energy Community directly
benefits the membership status of the Balkan states.38 In 2014, Western
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Balkan 6 Initiative (WB6) was launched under the Energy Community
umbrella to assist Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, North
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia for developing and integrating energy
ties, infrastructures and markets of these countries also assisting to
overcome challenges in transparency and anti-corruption.39 With the
EU’s single energy market objective, gas can be shared between the member
states, making the EU and the Balkans part of a more interconnected
market, making smaller states less vulnerable.
Table 2: Natural Gas Production, Consumption, And Trade of Non-EU
Balkan Countries
Source: International Energy Agency.
As shown in Table 2, Kosovo and Montenegro do not use natural
gas, and Albania consumes what it produces. Therefore, these three
countries do not import any gas. Bosnia & Herzegovina and North
Macedonia are totally dependent on gas imports because of a lack of
indigenous gas production. Serbia has low indigenous production and
imports most of its gas. These three countries import all of their gas from
Russia. In 2016, the total gas production of these six countries was
around 0.5 bcm, total gas consumption was around 2.5 bcm and total
net gas import was around 2 bcm, thus showing the small size of the
Balkan market.
With the realization of new pipelines such as Trans Adriatic Pipeline
(TAP) (10 bcm), and if realized the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP)
(5 bcm) and Eastring Pipeline (20-40 bcm),40 Azeri gas can be delivered
not only to EU Balkan states such as Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Albania 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,21 0,16 0,15 0,18 0,18 0,21 0,16 0,15 0,18 0,18
North Macedonia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,13 0,11 0,11 0,18 0,11 0,13 0,11 0,11 0,18
Kosovo 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Montenegro 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Serbia 0,42 0,42 0,44 0,46 0,42 1,68 1,87 1,61 1,75 1,89 1,43 1,50 1,11 1,39 1,43
Production (Mtoe) Consumption (Mtoe) Net Natural Gas Trade (Mtoe)
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41 J. Roberts, “Regional Energy Cooperation along Europe’s Southern Energy
Corridor.” The South Caucasus-Security, Energy and Europeanization,
Routledge, 2017, p. 206.
42 European Commission, “Gas and Oil Supply Routes”, https://ec.europa.eu/
energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies/gas-and-oil-supply-routes,
(accessed 15 June 2019).
43 Institute of Energy for Southeast Europe, p. 1121.
44 G. Rzayeva, “The Outlook for Azerbaijani Gas Supplies to Europe: Challenges
and Perspectives.” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2018, p.27, https:/
/www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/NG-97.pdf,
(accessed 26 June 2019).
Croatia but also to these non-EU Balkan countries. Thus, these pipelines
can enhance integrity and interconnection between non-EU and EU
Balkan states. Besides, planned LNG facilities in the Balkans will further
strengthen the interconnection and energy security in the region. However,
Russian and Azeri gas most likely to reduce short to medium term LNG
prospects in the Balkans, so the Balkan countries likely to continue their
reliance on pipeline bound gas. The delay of LNG in the region is due to
the need for clarity in the European gas market and Russia’s long-term
gas pricing strategies in respect to U.S. shale developments.41 The
difficulty in attracting investments to increase interconnectivity is the
small population and economy of the combined Balkan countries. Thus,
there are fewer incentives by outside and infrastructure projects are
difficult to implement. Hence, this relates back to why trade expectations
or purely economic investment rationale would not be sufficient but
only be complementary to understand approaches dealing with
institutional cooperation.
Southern Gas Corridor is one of the top priority corridors for the EU
since the corridor serves for the diversification efforts of the Union. The
corridor consists of several projects including pipelines and LNG
terminals. It aims to enhance the security of supply of Balkan countries,
facilitate competition and diversify gas supplies by bringing gas from
different regions such as the Middle East, the Caspian and the
Mediterranean.42
When Azerbaijan started negotiations with the buyers in 2010 before
supplying its gas over Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) (16 bcm),43 gas
prices in Italy were around 23 per cent higher compared to gas prices in
the Balkan countries. For this reason, Azerbaijan targeted to supply its
gas firstly to the Italian market.44 However, the country also considers
supplying its gas to the Balkan market in the future. Besides gas prices,
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currently the Balkan markets are very small and premature, and therefore
these markets are commercially less profitable for Azerbaijan. Therefore,
the additional supply of Azeri gas is dependent on the capacity
improvements in TANAP and TAP as well as favourable market conditions
in the Balkans. Another importance of these two pipelines (TANAP and
TAP) is that they can contribute to Italy’s and Greece’s aspirations to
become a Mediterranean gas hub.
Figure 3: An Expanded Southern Gas Corridor
Source: Institute of Energy for Southeast Europe.
Besides regional projects, Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline (EMP) (10
bcm) is the longest planned pipeline in the region that starts in Israel,
passes the island of Cyprus, through Greece and ends in Italy.45
Considering the low capacities of discovered gas deposits in Cyprus and
Israel in respect to gas demand of Europe, such a long underwater pipeline
construction is currently not be economically viable. Furthermore,
disputes over exclusive economic zones (EEZ) between Turkey and Greek
Cypriot government are other major obstacles for the realization of the
pipeline. Competition over resources has the risk to impede regional
cooperation and stability of Turkish-Greek relations, which are relevant
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for the transit of energy to the Balkans. Eastern Mediterranean energy
play could have an effect on energy security of the Balkans. However, its
effects remain to be seen in the future.
In order to protect its market domination in the Balkans and to
bypass Ukraine transit route after two Ukrainian crises, Russia developed
a new pipeline called Turkish Stream. The pipeline would be a direct
pipeline between Turkey and Russia, and it will have 31.5 bcm gas
capacity.46 Even though Russia targeted to supply its gas to TAP, the
pipeline granted an exemption of third-party accession from the EU.
Therefore, only Azeri gas can be supplied over TAP.47 If the capacity of the
pipeline is expanded, then Russia can supply its gas through that pipeline
since expanded capacity does not have an exemption under the EU’s
energy regulations. However, if Russia books the additional capacity of
TAP, this would jeopardize non-Russian suppliers since Russia would
dominate Southern Gas Corridor via TAP and Turkish Stream.48 In the
current context, Russia can supply its gas through the Trans-Balkan
pipeline by reversing the pipeline, interconnector Turkey- Greece and
planned Eastring pipeline. Besides dominating regional pipelines, Russia
also has an ambition to create a regional gas hub in the Southeastern
part of the Europe.
In recent years, several energy agreements have been signed between
Russia and Serbia; hence Russian investments in Serbia have grown
significantly.49 One of the reasons for these investments can be linked to
the desire of Russia to make Serbia a Russian gas hub in that region to
distribute its gas to the neighbouring countries. As indicated in Table 1,
among the Balkan countries, Serbia is on the lead in terms of attracting
investments, population, and economy. Therefore, this is a theoretically
convenient arrangement for Serbia; and Germany provides an example
of this situation in the EU. Indeed, Germany insists on ensuring the
continuity of the supply through Russian gas, whereas Poland and
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Lithuania favour LNG. Similarly, LNG can also be considered as a possible
alternative form of supplies for the Balkans.
4.1   LNG in the Balkans
As shown in (Figure 3), planned LNG facilities in Croatia (4-6 bcm),
Greece (6 bcm), and Albania (4-8 bcm) are designed to increase the
availability of gas supplies in the region.50 These three facilities will
have a significant contribution to LNG trade and distribution of gas in
the Balkans. However, for the LNG facility in Croatia, there are concerns
about objections by the local population, meanwhile importing Russian
gas through pipelines would be more cost-effective than importing LNG.
Furthermore, there are concerns about the financial sustainability of the
project. Therefore, economic viability considerations are slowing the
project in Croatia in spite of EU funding.51 Cheap and abundant Russian
gas led Greece and Albania to postpone their planned LNG projects,
which causes the Balkan countries to miss the opportunity of LNG.
Figure 4: Natural Gas Projections of Western Balkan Countries
Source: International Energy Agency and Institute of Energy for Southeast
Europe.
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According to Table 2, the gas demand of six Balkan countries will be
around 3.2 bcm in 2020 and around 6.3 bcm in 2040. Considering that
the total capacity of four LNG facilities will be over 15 bcm of gas, LNG
can be a game-changer in the region. To be more precise, including the
EU member Balkan states, total gas consumption of 10 Balkan countries
was around 21.6 bcm and total natural gas trade was around 10.8 bcm
in 2016. Thus, it is expected that total gas consumption of 10 countries
will be around 24 bcm in 2020 and around 26 bcm in 2040, while total
gas trade will be around 11.6 bcm in 2020 and around 15 bcm in 2040.
Therefore, LNG could cover more than 70 per cent gas consumption of
these countries which would secure the energy supplies of these countries.
At present, cheaper Russian gas erodes plans of the Balkan countries
to import LNG. This is because when importing LNG seems costly than
importing Russian gas, planned LNG facilities lose their financial feasibility
and have difficulties in attracting investments. In fact, the Balkan gas
and spot markets are immature and small. Besides, LNG still requires
long-term customer commitments and oil-indexed prices show similarities
with pipeline gas trade. Building LNG facilities are not enough to enhance
energy security of the region. One way to distribute LNG between the
Balkan countries is to boost gas interconnectivity. Consequently, the next
section will cover gas interconnections in the Balkans.
5.  ENHANCING ENERGY SECURITY THROUGH GAS
INTERCONNECTIVITY IN THE BALKANS
The European Union gives importance to the interconnections between
the EU countries as well as between EU and non-EU countries. With the
development of gas interconnectivity, the EU envisages gas markets to
be united. Once gas enters from the EU borders, European countries will
be able to share gas with each other inside the Union. Therefore, countries
will be able to access multiple gas sources and regional gas prices will be
eventually less differentiated.52
As shown in (Figure 4), Balkan interconnections are not well
connected. With the realization of the new interconnectors, the Balkan
52 T. Bros, “European Gas Markets: Key Trends”, The Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, 2017, p.9, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/
uploads/2017/09/European-Gas-Markets-Key-Trends.pdf (accessed 16 June
2019).
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countries will be able to share gas coming from pipelines and LNG with
each other, and their gas infrastructure will be connected. Since these
interconnectors can be compatible with existing and planned pipelines,
energy security in the Balkans will be enhanced to a greater degree. As
noted above, Greece currently has one operational LNG facility. With
these interconnectors, the country can distribute imported LNG to other
Balkan countries. This also applies to planned LNG facilities in Croatia
and Albania.
Figure 5: Planned, Under Construction and Existing Interconnectors
Source: Institute of Energy for Southeast Europe.
Besides, seaports and interconnectors, it is possible for the Balkan
countries to benefit from existing transportation infrastructure to share
LNG between them. Transportation of LNG is possible with the railroads
in the region, and it is possible with ships and inland ports in Danube
and Sava Rivers.53 To stimulate economic growth, export and form Pan-
53 A. Kovacevic, “Towards a Balkan Gas Hub: The Interplay between Pipeline
Gas, LNG and Renewable Energy in South East Europe”, The Oxford Institute
for Energy Studies, 2017, p.34, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/Towards-a-Balkan-gas-hub-NG-115.pdf (accessed
16 October 2019).
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European corridor, the EU has made significant investments to the railway
infrastructure of the Balkans. With the EU funds, Serbia has built new
railroads while Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo have
rehabilitated its existing railroads.54 Therefore, railways are alternative
to pipelines and interconnectors that can secure energy supplies of the
Balkan countries. Besides, road transportation is another alternative for
the Balkan countries to access LNG.
Danube River, the second biggest river in Europe, is bound to play a
useful role in this transportation plan because as many as ten countries
(Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania,
Moldova and Ukraine) share the river. These countries have 94 ports on
the river and 31 of them have the capability to receive liquid cargo.55 All
these ten countries have at least one port to handle that type of cargo.
Sava is another river in Europe that crosses Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia &
Herzegovina and Serbia.56 Together with railways, carrying LNG on these
two rivers will enhance interdependence between the Balkan countries
which is vital for stability and cooperation in the region.
Together with inland ports, railways and roads, the use of small-
scale LNG (ssLNG) have a potential to secure energy supplies of the
Balkan countries. SsLNG is contrary to traditional LNG. SsLNG is used
in its liquid form mostly as marine fuel, fuel for road transportation and
off grid power generation. It is an innovative solution for immature and
small gas markets like the Balkans. This is because its capacity can be
increased, and it is flexible to deal with demand fluctuations.57 However,
some factors determine the investments on ssLNG, including demand,
business model and alternative fuel prices.58 Therefore, it is a developing
trend that can be applicable to the Balkans.
54 B. Pekic, “European Funds Drive Balkan Railway Renaissance”, International
Railway Journal, 20 January 2019, https://www.railjournal.com/in_depth/
european-funds-drive-balkan-railway-renaissance (accessed 23 Nov 2019).
55 Danube Commission, “Danube Navigation”, Danube Commission, 2019, https:/
/www.danubecommission.org/dc/en/danube-navigation/ports-on-the-
danube/ (accessed 21 Nov 2019).
56 International Sava River Basin Commission, “About Basin”, International Sava
River Basin Commission, 2019, https://www.savacommission.org/basin_about
(accessed 21 Nov 2019).
57 G. Biscardini, R. Schmill and A. Maestro, “Why Small-Scale LNG May Be the
Next Big Wave”, PWC, 2017, https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/fr/fr/media/
small-going-big.pdf (accessed 10 Oct. 2019).
58 S. Karbuz, “Küçük, minik, minnacýk ölçekli  LNG”, PetroTürk, 25 Sep. 2019,
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6.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
In making a comparison of the internal and external factors associated
with gas trade, it is easy to identify certain advantages and disadvantages.
There are various internal/external and advantages/disadvantages for
non-EU Western Balkan countries. The combination of these factors is
critical for the future of the energy security of the Balkan countries as
well as the EU.
Table 3: Comparative Analysis of Internal and External Advantages and
Disadvantages
Source: The table is original contribution of the authors.
As an internal advantage, the Balkan countries have cultural and
geographical proximity to Western Europe which enables them to establish
good relations with the European countries. On the contrary, having a
small population, small economies of scale, premature gas markets and
less attraction for Foreign Direct Investments can be considered an internal
disadvantage for the Balkan countries. These factors directly affect
investments in the region.
The EU membership, funds and envisaged pipeline projects in the
region are external advantages for the Balkan countries. The EU
membership and its funds help these countries to approximate themselves
to the EU standards and to develop their infrastructure and
interconnectivity. The more interaction and engagement between Western
Balkan countries and the EU in the context of the EU membership, the
greater the possibility of these countries to attract investments from the
Internal External
Advantages Having a cultural and geographical proximity to Western Europe
The EU membership, the EU funds, 
envisaged pipeline projects in the region, 
NATO membership of some regional 
countries 
Disadvantages
Having a small population, small 
economies of scale, premature gas markets 
and less attractive for Foreign Direct 
Investments
High dependency on Russian gas,low 
infrastructure and interconnectivity, the 
possibility of existing and planned pipelines 
to postpone LNG projects in the region
Comparative Analysis of Internal and External Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Western Balkans 
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EU as well as European companies. Besides the EU membership, Albania
and Montenegro are NATO members while North Macedonia is likely to
join NATO, which suggests close ties of some Balkan countries with the
West.59 Secondly, envisaged pipeline projects are vital for the improvement
of energy security of the Balkan countries. In fact, the Southern Gas
Corridor is essential for the EU as a means of securing its energy supplies.
Therefore, stability and cooperation in the Balkans will directly contribute
to the energy security of the EU. On the contrary, as an external
disadvantage, these countries are already highly dependent on Russian
gas; they have low infrastructure and interconnectivity and envisaged
pipeline projects are likely to postpone LNG projects in the region. The
combination of pipeline and LNG projects in the region will highly secure
energy supplies of the Balkan and the EU countries. However, cheap
Russian gas combined with the prospectus Azeri gas coming over TANAP
and TAP may likely to delay LNG projects.
7.  CONCLUSION
Energy security in the Balkan countries has faced challenges and
uncertainties because of low interconnectivity between them. Thus, there
is a need for investments in the Balkans. The Balkan market is open to
greenfield investments and developments. There are major gas projects
in and around the region such as TANAP, TAP, IAP, Eastring pipeline,
EMP and Turkish Stream. Ongoing major project nearby creates certain
expectations and possibilities for Western Balkans. However, due to the
small scale of the Western Balkan market, trade expectations and simple
economic interdependence may not be sufficient motives to further
investment in this region. In this context, institutional cooperation (EU
integration) would complement the regional aspirations to increase energy
security but because the regional market is small, the question comes in
the form of supply, not in the source of supply. Institutional cooperation,
as well as the EU rules, regulations, standards and funds may help improve
suitability for potential investments. Policy entrepreneurship of the
Commission will also have a distinct role in increasing solidarity and
investments.
59 J. Bugajski, “NATO Is More Than Just a Security Organization”, 11 February
2019, https://www.cepa.org/nato-secures-the-western-balkans (accessed 15
July 2019).
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The increase in reliance on pipeline or LNG in the Balkans is
dependent and will be shaped by the global LNG market, geostrategic
context of the Eastern Mediterranean region, clarities related to European
gas market and Russia’s gas pricing strategies in respect to U.S. shale
developments. In this regard, the gas supplied via pipelines will likely
dominate the Balkans for quite some time which will reduce the short-
to medium-term LNG prospects in the Balkans. With the EU funds and
motivations, such as increasing energy security, environmental protection,
and good governance, energy infrastructure can be strengthened between
non-EU and EU Balkan countries. Good governance and anti-corruption
would further help these countries’ ability to attracting private
investments in addition to EU funds and incentives. However, at the end
of the day, economic viability has the last say on infrastructure investments.
Greece and Italy are potential candidates for Balkan gas hub in the
case of integrity of existing and planned projects in the region. Greece
has strong ambitions to distribute gas coming via TANAP, TAP and Turkish
Stream while Italy is the other candidate due to its developed gas market
and infrastructure. A suggested future research topic exploring which
hub(s) will be dominant (Italy, Greece, Turkey, Serbia, etc.) would help
understand future infrastructure serving the sub-region of the Balkans
in general and particularly for non-EU Balkans.
Finally, the realization of hubs in the region will be shaped by
economies of scale to attract significant investments, and possibly by EU
membership. This article argued that the EU, which gave a new
perspective for membership to the states of the Western the Balkans, is
also the main catalyst for those countries to realize infrastructure
investments to consolidate their energy security. Moreover, since these
countries, even when combined, constitute a small market, investments
are more likely to be realized by EU funds, entrepreneurship and
regulations solidifying the confidence of investors to these economies.
